Can the U.S. Courts Learn from Failed Terrorist Trials
by Military Commission in Turkey and Peru? by Wilson, Richard
resident George W. Bush signed a military order in Nove m b e r
2001 that provided for trial by military commission for any
person designated by the president as an illegal combatant. All
of the detainees in Guantanamo Ba y, Cuba, along with thre e
U.S. citizens held in Defense De p a rtment custody on the U.S. mainland,
h a ve been so designated. That designation makes military commissions
their only legal re d ress, if they are to be tried at all. This leaves both the
decision to try them and the stru c t u re and pro c e d u re of their trials exc l u-
s i vely in the hands of the exe c u t i ve branch. 
This article examines the controversial issue of trial by military
commission and the convictions of alleged terrorists in Tu rkey and Pe ru
by such commissions. This ye a r, re v i ewing courts ove rturned these con-
victions and pre-empted any future death sentences. Both decisions
found that the defendants’ rights to due process and fair trial had been
denied, thus necessitating expensive and prolonged new trials before
legitimate civilian courts. These cases suggest that careful re v i ew by the
j u d i c i a ry can keep exc e s s i ve actions by the exe c u t i ve branch in check, but
only if the judiciary of the United States is willing to step in to prov i d e
the needed objectivity and dispassionate re v i ew of exe c u t i ve decision-
making. 
THE DETAINEES AT GUANTANAMO BAY:
TWO YEARS WITHOUT REDRESS
STARTING TWO YEARS AGO in November 2001, the United St a t e s
De p a rtment of Defense began to detain foreign nationals without
charges or trial at Camp Delta, a prison that is part of a larger U.S. mil-
i t a ry installation at Guantanamo Ba y, Cuba. Although names and
nationalities are not published by the military, it is believed that the
detainees now total around 650, some of whom are known to be chil-
d ren, and that they come from more than 40 countries around the world,
not just Afghanistan. The U.S. military has potential space for up to
1,000 detainees and a 10-year operating budget. Press re p o rts indicate
that detainees we re moved into Camp Delta as recently as Ma rch 2003:
with transfers there from other countries such as Bosnia and Ga m b i a .
Although some detainees have been released, the number of detainees
remains approximately the same.  As of July 2003, there had been at least
29 suicide attempts by 18 individuals held in the detention facility. 
All of the Guantanamo detainees have been effectively denied the
p rotection of the Ge n e va Conventions, which govern the treatment of
prisoners of war. No Guantanamo detainee has yet been brought before
a competent tribunal to determine his status as soldier or civilian as
re q u i red by the Ge n e va Conventions. None of the Gu a n t a n a m o
detainees has had access to any court or legal counsel, and family mem-
bers have not been permitted to visit them in Cuba. The need for a judi-
cial determination of status is made all the more urgent by ongoing trans-
fers into the facility from locations other than Afghanistan, which re b u t
the gove r n m e n t’s assertion that all the prisoners are “battlefield”
detainees. The detainees face two equally odious realities: Some will be
chosen by the president for trial by military commission while others will
be kept in indefinite detention.
In July 2003, the Defense De p a rtment issued a compre h e n s i ve and
final set of pro c e d u res for the military commissions, and pursuant to
those pro c e d u res the secre t a ry of defense named military lawyers as both
chief prosecutor and chief defense counsel. Soon there a f t e r, the pre s i d e n t
announced that six detainees we re eligible for trial by the commissions,
including two British citizens, but no trials have begun as of this writing.
The commission rules include limitations on the right of the accused to
choose their defense counsel, significant interf e rence with the full abili-
ties of defense counsel to pre p a re and mount an adequate defense,
i m p roper and lower standards of due process for non-citizens, no re v i ew
of decisions of the commissions by independent courts, and the death
penalty as a potential sanction. The provisions for trial by military com-
mission also apply to the three U.S. citizen detainees.  It seems that the
g overnment can invoke the provisions at any time, even during a pend-
ing civil trial. 
Such seems to be the case in the trial of Zacarias Moussaoui, a
French national charged with terrorist activities awaiting trial in a feder-
al court in the state of Virginia. The trial judge recently sanctioned the
p rosecutors, telling them that they could not seek the death penalty if
they continued to refuse Moussaoui access to key witnesses who might
p rovide exc u l p a t o ry evidence on his behalf, but who are being held in
s e c ret detention and interrogation facilities by the government. The gov-
ernment is considering transfering the case to a military commission as
one viable option for the completion of the proceedings.  
Any detainee designated as an illegal combatant, whether citizen or
n o n - c i t i zen, but who is not tried by military commission, faces an eve n
m o re daunting fate. They will remain prisoners until they are released by
the military without trial or until the end of the war on terrorism, a seem-
ingly endless prospect.  
LESSONS FROM TURKEY:
THE FAILED TRIAL OF ABDULLAH ÖCALAN
IN MARCH 2003, the Eu ropean Court of Human Rights decided the
case of Abdullah Öcalan, former leader of the Ku rdish Wo rk e r’s Pa rt y
(PKK). The PKK supported independence for Ku rdish communities in
Tu rkey and Iraq. The party was outlawed in Tu rkey and is included on
the U.S. State De p a rt m e n t’s list of designated foreign terrorist organiza-
tions. Öcalan became the leader of the PKK during the mid-1980s and
operated from a safe haven in neighboring Syria. The PKK army carried
out more than 6,000 attacks in Tu rkey alone, leaving a total of 30,000
dead rebels, soldiers, and civilians. In 1999, when the Tu rkish gove r n-
ment threatened to invade Syria if it continued to protect him, Öcalan
m oved through several countries before ending up in Na i robi, Ke n y a ,
w h e re he was captured and forcibly returned to Tu rkey by the security
police without any judicial process. On the day of his arrest in Ke n y a ,
t h e re we re riots, both pro and con, in the streets of Tu rkey and other
countries in Eu rope. 
Back in Tu rk e y, Öcalan was immediately transported to the tiny,
uninhabited island of Imrali, in the Sea of Marmara, where he was the
sole inmate in a facility where his trial was to be held under State Se c u r i t y
C o u rt pro c e d u res. The three-judge panel that initially heard his case was
made up of one military officer and two civilians, but the military judge
was re m oved and replaced by a civilian judge during the trial. T h e
replacement re q u i red a special act of the Tu rkish National Assembly,
1 2
Can the U.S. Courts Learn from Failed Terrorist Trials 
by Military Commission in Turkey and Peru?
by  Richard  Wi l s o n
P
taken in the face of international criticism that Öcalan could not re c e i ve
a fair trial before a court with strong military influence. His lawyers we re
g i ven only limited access to their client before the trial, the number of
l a w yers permitted to visit him was limited, and all conversations betwe e n
them and their client we re monitored by government officials.
In June 1999, Öcalan was convicted of training and leading a gang
of armed terrorists in carrying out acts designed to bring about the seces-
sion of a southwest territory in Tu rk e y, and he was sentenced to death.
On the day of his sentencing, families of his victims in attendance at the
c o u rt proceedings spontaneously broke into singing the Tu rkish nation-
al anthem. Despite domestic appeals and a commutation of the death
sentence by the Tu rkish National Assembly, again in the face of Eu ro p e a n
p re s s u re, Öcalan’s conviction was upheld. He then filed a petition for
human rights violations with the Eu ropean Court of Human Rights
( Eu ropean Court). 
The decision of the
Eu ropean Court in Öcalan v.
Tu rk e y was critical of the domes-
tic proceedings in four key
respects that relate to the pro-
posed military commission trials
in Gu a n t a n a m o. First, the gov-
ernment defended the independ-
ence of the State Security Court
because the military judge was
re m oved from the pro c e e d i n g s
and the judgment of the panel
was made by an all-civilian court .
Howe ve r, in keeping with the
e x t remely re s t r i c t i ve view of the
role of military tribunals, the
Eu ropean Court found that “t h e
last-minute replacement of the
m i l i t a ry judge was not capable of
curing the defect in the composi-
tion of the court . ”
Second, the Eu ropean Court condemned the Tu rkish gove r n m e n t
for its delays in the adjudicative processes afforded to the accused. T h e
Eu ropean Court found that a delay of seven days from Öcalan’s return to
Tu rkey before being presented before a judge violated the re q u i re m e n t
under international human rights law that an answer be bro u g h t
“p ro m p t l y” before a judge. Si m i l a r l y, Tu rkey violated Öcalan’s right to a
speedy remedy to determine the lawfulness of his detention when he was
kept incommunicado for ten days from his lawyers, and how he “c o u l d
not reasonably be expected under such conditions to be able to challenge
the lawfulness and length of his detention without the assistance of his
l a w ye r.” 
T h i rd, the Eu ropean Court found that Tu rkey had seriously inter-
f e red with Öcalan’s right to pre p a re and conduct a defense, where there
we re lengthy denials of access to defense counsel, where the length and
time of meetings with counsel was seve rely restricted, and where all con-
fidential conversations between counsel and client we re re q u i red to be
conducted within the sight and hearing of prison officers, which the gov-
ernment defended as necessary “to ensure the applicant’s security.” 
Fo u rth, despite the amendment of Tu rkish domestic law to bar the
death penalty against Öcalan, the Eu ropean Court went to great lengths
to note that the imposition of the death penalty at the conclusion of an
unfair trial constituted inhuman treatment in itself and thus a violation
of his human rights.     
LESSONS FROM PERU:
THE TRIAL OF ABIMAEL GUZMAN
ABIMAEL GUZMAN BECAME THE INTELLECTUAL and military leader
of the Se n d e ro Lu m i n o s o, or “Shining Pa t h”, guerrilla movement in Pe ru
in the late 1960s. The gro u p, inspired by Ma rxist and Maoist ideologies,
began armed actions in 1980 under the slogan “Elections no; Pe o p l e’s
War yes.” Be t ween 1980 and 1990, Guzman and the Shining Path car-
ried out over 120,000 attacks throughout Pe ru, leaving 19,000 dead,
including some 10,000 innocent civilians. In fact, the recent truth com-
mission re p o rt in Pe ru notes that the number of deaths caused by the
insurgents exceeded those caused by military and police forces. 
A l b e rto Fujimori, president of Pe ru at the time of Gu z m a n’s arre s t
in 1992, made decisive and aggre s s i ve military and legal action against
the Shining Path a hallmark of his administration. Fujimori bent the law
to his will and temporarily became a national hero for his decisive actions
in the name of national security. He later fled the country to avoid arre s t
in the midst of growing re velations of scandal and corruption in the high-
est ranks of his administration.
Guzman was arrested, tried and sentenced during September and
October of 1992. Be f o re his trial, he was kept on prominent public dis-
p l a y, donning a striped suit in an open cage, and the prison where he was
held maintained extreme measures of security. He was tried and sen-
tenced by a special military court dealing with terrorist crimes to life
imprisonment. President Fujimori personally decreed that the sentence
be served in the total darkness of an underground cell so that Gu z m a n
would never see the light of day again in his lifetime. 
After Gu z m a n’s trial, Fujimori called for the re-adoption and
re t ro a c t i ve application of the death penalty, abolished in the 1979 con-
stitution. Fujimori asserted that nine out of ten Pe ruvians called for
Gu z m a n’s death and announced that he was pre p a red to withdraw fro m
the most basic Inter-American human rights tre a t y, which forbids re i n-
stitution of the death penalty by those countries that have abolished it, to
appease the people of his country. The Fujimori administration took
a c t i ve steps in that direction throughout the 1990s.
The path of judicial re v i ew for Guzman was a long and complex
one, not nearly as direct as that taken by Öcalan in the Eu ropean human
rights system. The first issue presented for international re v i ew was the
l e g a l i t y, under the American Convention on Human Rights (American
C o n vention), of the proposed amendment to the Pe ruvian Constitution
to permit the re-institution of the death penalty. That issue was re s o l ve d
against Pe ru in Ad v i s o ry Opinion OC-14/94 of the In t e r - A m e r i c a n
C o u rt of Human Rights (Inter-American Court), decided in De c e m b e r
1994. Article 4.3 of the American Convention explicitly prohibits the
reestablishment of the death penalty in states that have abolished it. T h e
case did not present the Inter-American Court with an actual controve r-
s y, and the name of neither Guzman nor the Shining Path was on the
c o u rt’s docket, but it made clear in its conclusions that “p romulgation of
a law in manifest conflict with the obligations assumed by a state upon
ratifying or adhering to the [American] Convention is a violation of that
t re a t y.” Pe ru could not readopt the death penalty without violating inter-
national law, and Guzman could never be sentenced to death. 
It was not the advisory opinion, howe ve r, that led the Pe ruvian gov-
ernment under President Fujimori to attempt to withdraw from the
jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court in 1999. That action came in
the wake of a series of decisions by the Inter-American Court that we re
highly critical of the Special Mi l i t a ry Court, a tribunal created to deal
with terrorists through summary trials before so-called “faceless,” or
unidentifiable, military judges, without judicial re v i ew or other safe-
g u a rds. The two decisions of Loayza Ta m a yo v. Pe ru and Castillo Pe t ru z z i
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v. Pe ru we re devastating indictments against the failed attempts by mili-
t a ry courts to mete out justice to alleged terrorists. The In t e r - A m e r i c a n
C o u rt condemned both the specific use of “f a c e l e s s” judges and military
trials in general, even in the case of alleged terrorist acts by persons “a s s o-
ciated with insurgency groups.” The Inter-American Court noted that
m i l i t a ry personnel cannot maintain impartiality in judging those who are
its enemies in the field. Mo re ove r, because superior military officerd
decided appointments to the military court as well as the promotion in
rank of judges, the Inter-Americn Court called into question the inde-
pendence of thees judges. 
The other violations found by the Inter-American Court in Ca s t i l l o
Pe t ru z z i set out a catalog of the shortcomings of military commissions:
the offenses for which the alleged terrorists could be convicted we re ove r-
ly broad, thus violating the principle of legality; the conditions of con-
finement we re cruel, inhuman, and degrading; confessions we re coerc e d
t h rough tort u re or other cruel and degrading treatment; the defendants
did not have the time and facilities to meet with defense counsel to pre-
p a re an adequate defense; the rules of evidence did not permit fair par-
ticipation of the defense during trial; and there was no right to appeal to
civilian court s .
Pe ru eventually returned to the fold of the inter-American human
rights system under the presidency of Alejandro To l e d o. In Ja n u a ry of
this ye a r, in what is called one of its most significant decisions, the
Constitutional Court of Pe ru decided Ma rcelino Tineo Si l va et. al., a case
b rought by more than 5,000 citizens who sought the re v i ew and uncon-
stitutionality of the terrorism and military court decrees issued by the
e xe c u t i ve branch during the Fujimori years. The Constitutional Court ,
f o l l owing the roadmap laid out for it by the Inter-American Court ,
s t ruck down all the anti-terrorist decrees and ord e red the retrial of
Guzman and an estimated 2,000 other persons convicted during those
years. In late July 2003, the government prosecutor recommended to a
civilian court a sentence of 20 years for Guzman for his alleged invo l ve-
ment in the May 1991 terrorist attacks in the capital city of Lima.
THE ILLEGITIMACY OF TRIAL BY MILITARY COMMISSION
FOR GUANTANAMO DETAINEES
WHILE COMPARING THE SEVERITY OF TERRORIST actions is difficult
to measure, the attacks orchestrated by Öcalan and Guzman seem eve ry
bit as vicious and destru c t i ve as those of the Al Qaeda network to date.
The cases in Tu rkey and Pe ru against these two notorious terrorists are
analogous in many ways to the U.S. gove r n m e n t’s proposed trials by mil-
i t a ry commission of the Guantanamo detainees. 
In both the Öcalan and Guzman proceedings, military judges
p l a yed key roles in the decision-making. The Guantanamo military com-
missions will be staffed by three to seven military officers, and both the
chief prosecutor and chief defense counsel are also military lawye r s .
Mo re ove r, the only appeal from their decisions is within the De p a rt m e n t
of Defense and to the president, and access is not permitted to the civil-
ian justice system on appeal from judgments of the commissions. T h e
re s p e c t i ve decisions in Öcalan and Guzman both criticized the lack of
e f f e c t i ve access and re v i ew by civilian court s .
Detainees in Guantanamo have experienced delays in access to
the courts of up to two years in some cases. In the Öcalan pro c e e d i n g s ,
periods of seven and ten days without access to the courts or counsel
we re deemed exc e s s i ve under re l e vant human rights norms. The ru l e s
for defense counsel at the Guantanamo military commissions also
include provisions similar to those faced by the lawyers for Öcalan and
Guzman. They include a re q u i rement that civilian defense counsel sign
an affidavit, which permits open monitoring of confidential attorney-
client conversations by government officials “for security and intelli-
gence purposes.” 
In both the Tu rkey and Pe ru cases, international tribunals found that
domestic justice had failed these two individuals and hundreds of others
condemned through the same processes, and new trials we re re q u i re d .
CONCLUSION
IN HIS JULY 2002 REPORT to the UN Sub-Commission on the
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Louis Joinet, the Sp e c i a l
R a p p o rteur on the Issue of the Administration of Justice thro u g h
Mil i t a ry Tribunals, wrote that “In all circumstances, the competence of
m i l i t a ry tribunals should be abolished in favour of those of the ord i n a ry
c o u rts, for trying persons responsible for serious human rights viola-
t i o n s . ”
The Un i versal Declaration of Human Rights (Declaration), the
foundational expression of human rights principles, re c o g n i zes that not
all human rights are absolute. Article 29(2) of the Declaration permits
states to limit the exe rcise of human rights, provided that the sole pur-
pose is to secure “due recognition and respect for the rights and fre e d o m s
of others” and of meeting “the just re q u i rements of . . . public ord e r.” T h e
Declaration also re c o g n i zes, howe ve r, that a state cannot justify its limi-
tation on human rights if its actions are “aimed at the destruction of any
of the rights and fre e d o m s” proclaimed in the Declaration. The “p u b l i c
o rd e r” justifications offered by the United States government for its pro-
posed use of military commissions, as well as its potentially indefinite
confinement of the Guantanamo detainees, have destroyed all human
rights protections for the detainees.
The United States, with one of the strongest and most re s p e c t e d
criminal justice systems in the world, has chosen to deal with the
Guantanamo prisoners, and all others designated “illegal combatants,”
not through our much-lauded criminal processes, but in trials that will
take place totally outside our system of civilian justice. If brought to trial
b e f o re military commissions designed in the heat of a post-September 11
passion for vengeance, there is eve ry reason to believe that the
Guantanamo detainees will be subject to the same criticisms as the court s
that convicted Ocalan and Guzman. Because the United States refuses to
submit to the jurisdiction of international human rights bodies, it is up
to the domestic courts of the United States to take a firm stand against
abuses by the exe c u t i ve branch. They are the last legal hope for the
detainees, whether they face trial by military commission or indefinite
incommunicado detention.  H R B
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